Recent literature finds that a CEO's media visibility is positively associated with job acquisition and pay premiums. However, the literature has been quiet about whether media coverage is naturally bestowed upon CEOs, or whether CEOs are able to influence media coverage. That is, are CEO media stars born or made? We examine the extent to which CEOs "self-promote" by naming or quoting themselves within press releases, and the effects of self-promotion on CEO media coverage and compensation. We find that CEO self-promotion is positively associated with the importance of news releases and is asymmetrically associated with good news more than bad news, which is consistent with CEO selfpromotion being an intentional act based on cost/benefit analysis. Turning to the external media, we find evidence consistent with CEO self-promotion leading to significantly greater media coverage of the CEO. Finally, we examine whether the value of external media coverage to CEOs varies based on whether or not the coverage is a result of self-promotion. Preliminary results show that both "organic" and "promoted" media coverage are positively associated with CEO compensation.
Introduction
Prior literature finds that a CEO's media visibility is positively associated with job acquisition and pay premiums (Falato, Li, and Milbourn 2013; Malmendier and Tate 2009; Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora 2006) . These results are attributed to internal and external stakeholders using the CEO's media visibility as a signal about his ability and efforts. The literature thus far has been quiet about whether media visibility is naturally bestowed upon CEOs, or whether CEOs are able to influence media coverage. That is, are CEO media stars born or made? Our study investigates the natural question of whether and how CEOs can influence their media coverage and, in turn, receive benefits such as enhanced career outcomes.
Theoretical and empirical studies examining CEO visibility posit that the causal link between CEO media visibility and compensation is that the media tend to cover more talented CEOs, and therefore boards of directors use media visibility to inform hiring and compensation decisions. That is, CEOs that are more visible in the media are thought to be more valuable and to have greater external employment opportunities, and are therefore awarded higher compensation. This CEO media visibility could provide value to the firm in a variety of ways, or it could simply be used by the Board of Directors as justification to provide the CEO with their desired compensation. In either case, CEO visibility is a type of performance metric, and like any performance metric, CEOs have an incentive to influence this signal.
Following this, our first research question is whether the CEO can "self-promote" in firm disclosures in such a way that affects media coverage.
1 When reporting on firm news, journalists face a cost/benefit tradeoff in deciding whether to write about the CEO individually. The benefit to journalists of producing media content is derived from meeting readers' demands for relevant information. Thus, in writing about a firm news event, a journalist is more likely to cover the CEO individually when he is more relevant to the news. However, there is a cost to journalists of obtaining CEO-specific content, and we posit that CEOs can affect the journalists' production costs by voluntarily providing or withholding information about himself. It is an empirical question whether the CEO can alter journalists' production costs enough to outweigh the effects of readership demand (or lack thereof).
Our second research question examines whether media coverage that is the result of selfpromotion provides value to the CEO and firm. On one hand, if CEO media coverage is valuable to the firm regardless of whether it is "organic" or "promoted," then both organic and promoted coverage should be similarly reflected in the CEO's compensation, assuming compensation contracts are efficient (at least on average). This value to the firm of visibility could come from stakeholders such as investors, employees, or customers considering the CEO's media visibility when transacting with the firm. To the extent these stakeholders put a premium on transacting with a more talented CEO, the CEO's visibility provides a benefit to the firm (thus justifying the CEO's higher compensation). 2 On the other hand, selfpromotion activities could be ineffective if stakeholders can differentiate "promoted" from "organic" coverage, or could even be viewed as detrimental if promotion activities take the CEO away from other productive tasks.
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Our empirical approach is to examine CEO self-promotion in firm-initiated press releases (PRs), and the effects of PR self-promotion on coverage of the CEO in associated media articles. We choose to examine PRs as opposed to other forms of communication (e.g., CEO interviews) for several reasons.
First, PRs are firms' most basic communication method with the media, and CEOs can readily determine the extent of their presence in a firm-initiated PR. Second, using PRs allows us to examine a setting where the firm has already chosen to communicate news to the media, so we are able to more 2 Our current tests do not directly examine whether and how CEO visibility is valuable to the firm (in addition to the CEO), but in a future draft, we plan on examining the impact of CEO media visibility on firm value through various avenues, as well as whether that impact varies for promoted versus organic media coverage. 3 We use the term "organic" media coverage to refer to media coverage of the CEO that would likely have occurred in the absence of any self-promotion. "Promoted" media coverage is the incremental coverage generated by the CEO's self-promotion activities.
accurately gauge the causes and effects of CEO self-promotion while holding the economic news constant. Third, self-promotion in a PR is a unilateral decision by the firm/CEO, while examining selfpromotion in something like an interview requires bilateral participation by the media.
We develop two proxies for the extent to which the CEO self-promotes within each PR. The first is a simple binary classification of whether the CEO names himself anywhere in the PR (variable CEONAME). The second is a binary variable for whether the CEO is individually quoted in the PR (CEOQUOTE). CEOQUOTE likely involves more discretion than CEONAME; that is, even if a CEO cannot easily avoid naming himself in a particular PR, he likely still has discretion over whether he provides a direct quote. Given the importance of quotes to reporters writing to gain reader attention, we expect CEOQUOTE to be a stronger measure of intentional CEO self-promotion. We use the coinciding absolute two-day cumulative abnormal stock market returns (variable CAR_ABS) to measure the economic importance of the news contained in a firm's PR. Similarly, our primary measure of the sign of the news contained in the firm's PR (i.e., whether good or bad) is the sign of coinciding two-day returns (CAR).
Our analysis of related external media coverage is based on articles about the firm written by
Thomson Reuters news affiliates within two-day windows of the press releases. 4 Having the text of both the PRs and media articles allows us to perform detailed comparisons of how a CEO's portrayal in a firminitiated PR affects the external media's portrayal of the CEO in related news coverage. Our measures of CEO media coverage are similar to those used to measure CEO self-promotion: a binary for whether the reporter mentions the CEO's name (CEONAME_MEDIA), and a binary for whether the CEO is quoted in the media article (CEOQUOTE_MEDIA). 4 Thomson Reuters is one of the two major news aggregators, incorporating articles from numerous journalists. Although our sample of external media coverage is not comprehensive, we assume that journalist content from Thomson Reuters provides a reasonable representation of the ways in which professional business journalists write about CEOs. Supporting this, Green, Hand, and Penn (2014) find that newswires and mainstream media (national and local) have similar coverage tendencies. However, if non-newswire media responds to CEOs in a systematically different way than newswire media, our conclusions are currently limited to the impact of CEO selfpromotion on newswire media.
Our sample includes 365,292 press releases (PRs) issued by S&P 1500 firms from 2007 through 2013. Of these PRs, we find that 29.4% mention the CEO and 21.6% include a quote from the CEO, providing preliminary evidence of variation in the CEO's decision to self-promote. Turning to incentives that affect the self-promotion decision, our first finding is that CEOs are more likely to self-promote in economically important news, regardless of whether it is good or bad. On average, moving from the smallest to largest decile of absolute stock returns (i.e., CAR_ABS) is associated with a 27.4 percentage point increase in the probability of the CEO being named in the PR, and a 29 percentage point increase of the CEO being quoted. These results persist when controlling for firm characteristics and restricting the analysis to within-CEO variation. We also find that CEOs are more likely to self-promote in PRs conveying good news than bad news. Comparing the most extreme negative to positive deciles of associated signed stock returns, we find that the probability of the CEO being named increases by 3
percentage points (or a 7% relative increase), and the probability of the CEO being quoted increased by 3 percentage points (or 8.5% relative increase). These results are consistent with CEOs exercising discretion over whether to name or quote themselves, based on the underlying costs and benefits of self-promotion.
We next examine whether CEO self-promotion affects media coverage. We identify 132,800 related media articles that are published within two days of the firm's press release. On average, 15.6% of the media articles name the CEO, and 10.2% include a CEO quote. We find that mentioning the CEO by name in a firm-initiated PR increases the probability of being named by the reporter by 19.5
percentage points (or a 235% relative increase). CEO self-promotion by including a quote in a PR increases the probability of a reporter quoting the CEO by 16.3 percentage points (or a 333% relative increase). Overall, we find evidence that CEO self-promotion increases media coverage of the CEO across all types of news (good, bad, important, and unimportant), even after controlling for the characteristics of the firm and CEO fixed effects.
Having found evidence consistent with CEOs being able to increase media coverage via selfpromotion, we next turn to our second question of whether the source of CEO media coverage (i.e., "organic" versus "promoted") affects the previously documented positive relation between CEO media coverage and compensation (Falato et al. 2013) . Using annual measures of CEO media coverage and the log of total compensation, we find evidence consistent with prior literature that media coverage of the CEO is positively correlated with compensation levels, controlling for various measures of performance and firm characteristics. We then examine whether the positive relation is attenuated for CEO media coverage that is "promoted," or likely driven by the CEO's disclosure practices, versus the "organic" CEO media coverage that would likely have occurred without CEO self-promotion. We find no significant differences in the relations between "promoted" versus "organic" media coverage and CEO compensation, which is consistent with self-promoted CEO media coverage returning value to the CEO and the firm.
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Our study contributes to three streams of literature. The first is to the visibility literature. In the capital market setting, information barriers result in a subset of firms being less visible to investors (Merton 1987, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . A number of papers examine the implications of firm visibility (e.g., Lehavy and Sloan 2008; Blankespoor, Miller, and White 2014) and actions taken by firms to affect visibility (e.g., Francis, Hanna, and Philbrick 1997; Bushee and Miller 2012; deHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock 2014) . We extend this literature by examining implications of CEO media visibility and the actions CEOs take to impact that visibility.
Our second contribution is to the voluntary disclosure literature. There is a rich literature that examines firm disclosure choices and acknowledges that managers have incentives distinct from the 5 Throughout the draft, we focus on CEOs' choice to self-promote. However, it could be that the media demands quotes from high compensation CEOs because they are talented. Thus, providing quotes in PRs is simply a result of high visibility rather than a cause. We attempt to rule out the possibility of completely demand-driven promotion by showing asymmetries in self-promotion, including firm and CEO control variables, and documenting the changes in self-promotion within CEO. In addition, in a future draft, we plan on examining more discretionary aspects of the quote such as vividness that are unlikely to be influenced by media demand.
firm (e.g., Nagar 1999; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Cheng and Lo 2006) . These studies examine whether the extent and timing of firm disclosures are affected by CEO compensation and career concerns. We build on this literature by focusing on the CEO's choice to become personally and publicly involved with firm disclosure, and the impact of that choice. Our paper is also relevant for the area of reputation management within voluntary disclosure. Several recent studies have focused on the relation between strategic disclosures and the firm's external reputation (deHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin 2013; Chakravarthy, deHaan, and Rajgopal 2014) , and we examine whether and how CEOs develop an individual media reputation via disclosure strategy.
Our third contribution is to the literature on CEO compensation and agency costs. Falato et al. (2013) find that CEOs with more media coverage receive higher overall compensation, and Milbourn (2003) finds that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher when the CEO has higher media coverage, providing evidence that Boards of Directors use CEO media visibility in compensation decisions as a signal of the CEO's ability and efforts. In their study of "superstar" CEOs, Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that CEOs who receive awards from outside media groups also receive more compensation following the awards. Malmendier and Tate (2009) raise the possibility that the increased compensation may be a result of certain CEOs being able to use self-promotion to take credit for lucky past performance, but they fail to find evidence that superstar CEOs self-promote via earnings management or by giving more interviews. Our study is the first to investigate whether CEOs selfpromote through strategic disclosure, and our finding that self-promotion leads to greater media coverage builds on our understanding of the causes and implications of CEO media visibility. 
Hypotheses
6 Our results likely conflict with Malmendier and Tate (2009) for several reasons. First, Malmendier and Tate test for self-promotion among the subset of CEOs that win elite awards, while we study self-promotion across a broader range of CEOs. Second, Malmendier and Tate measure self-promotion by earnings management or by giving more interviews, while we measure more subtle and unilateral self-promotion in firm disclosures. Third, our sample covers a more recent period than Malmendier and Tate (2007 -2013 versus 1975 -2002 , and it is plausible that CEO self-promotion has evolved over time.
CEO media visibility and self-promotion
Boards evaluate CEO talent and effort when making ex ante hiring decisions and when determining year-end compensation and contract renewals. The CEO's true talent and effort are unobservable, so boards rely on noisy signals (such as firm performance and share price) of the CEO's performance that incorporate current and prior information (Holmstrom 1979; Lambert 1983) . Recent papers have focused on CEO media coverage as an additional measure of CEO quality, providing evidence that CEO media visibility is positively associated with compensation-related factors such as job acquisition, job retention, pay premium, stock-based pay-sensitivity, and pay-sensitivity to industry-wide and market-wide factors (Milbourn 2003; Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora 2006; Malmendier and Tate 2009; Falato, Li, and Milbourn 2013. 7 There are several interpretations of CEO media visibility. First, media coverage of CEOs could be used as a signal of talent by multiple stakeholders (e.g., boards, investors, employees, and customers), based on the assumption that the media is more likely to cover more talented CEOs. To the extent that stakeholders adjust their actions because of the CEO visibility, the media coverage of the CEO could positively impact firm value. For example, the pool of potential employees may increase as CEO visibility increases, allowing the firm to hire more qualified employees. If this is the case, boards would appropriately consider CEOs' media coverage when setting compensation because it is a measure of a specific type of firm value delivered by the CEO. A second interpretation of CEO media visibility is that the media provides an external assessment of the CEO at a relatively low cost, and boards consider it in setting compensation either because it is a useful additional signal of talent, or because it provides 7 These studies often equate CEO media coverage with CEO "reputation," where the general construct is collective beliefs about quality (Shapiro 1982; Hirshleifer 1993) . Supporting this, small sample analysis in prior research finds that nearly all CEO media coverage is nonnegative, and thus the studies do not attempt to differentiate between favorable and unfavorable discussions of the CEO in large samples of media articles (Milbourn 2003 , Rajgopal et al. 2006 . We focus on CEO visibility as the more direct construct underlying CEO media coverage and acknowledge that high visibility could result in either favorable or unfavorable CEO media coverage of a given event. We intend to further explore favorable versus unfavorable media coverage in a future draft.
plausible justification for providing the CEO's desired level of compensation. In either interpretation, CEO media visibility would be a part of performance evaluation and impact compensation and career outcomes.
CEOs have an incentive to influence any signal that is used in performance evaluation. Thus, we expect that, all else equal, CEOs endeavor to increase their media visibility. One mechanism for gaining media coverage is for the CEO to take actions to generate more value for the firm, since value-increasing actions are more likely to be meaningful for media consumers and thus be covered by media. An additional mechanism is to use disclosure to influence media coverage, holding constant the economic events, and this is the focus of our study. Our primary research question is whether CEOs influence their media visibility by promoting themselves in firm disclosures, consistent with their personal incentives.
To examine this question, we turn to CEO involvement in firm-initiated press releases (PR). PRs are firms' most basic communication method with the media, and CEOs can choose the extent to which they are named or quoted in a firm-initiated PR. Naming or quoting the CEO in a PR provides journalists information about the CEO at a low cost, and also signals to journalists that the CEO is more willing to discuss the news event with media. Thus, increasing the CEO's presence in a PR potentially increases the likelihood of CEO media coverage. However, if media visibility is a signal of CEO talent, and if CEOs can influence media visibility by self-promoting in PRs, then the act of self-promoting must come at a cost (else we would observe CEO promotion in all PRs). The most direct cost of naming or quoting the CEO in a PR is that doing so requires that the CEO spend more time monitoring the creation of the PR, as well as fielding follow-up questions from media instead of other productive tasks. In addition, there may be diminishing returns to the CEO's presence in a PR, so increasing visibility via a mention or quote in the current period comes at the cost of a diminished effect in a future period. Finally, more generally, increased visibility in the media could result in the "burden of celebrity," where expectations for the CEO are raised and compensation is more negatively impacted when performance is poor (Fombrun 1996) .
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Based on these costs and benefits, we make two predictions about CEOs' choice to selfpromote. First, if CEOs' goal is to increase visibility in the media, we expect CEOs to self-promote more when the PR conveys important information. A key role of journalists is to provide important information to their readers (Miller 2006; Green, Hand, and Penn 2014) , so the probability and extent of media coverage of any given PR increases as the importance of the news increases. Since the media is more likely to cover important news, a CEO seeking to get media coverage has a greater incentive to self-promote in important news.
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H1a: CEO self-promotion in firm-initiated press releases is increasing with the economic importance of the firm's news.
Our second prediction is based on the possibility that costs and benefits of a CEO's presence in a PR vary based on the sign of the news. Specifically, CEOs may have incentives to asymmetrically associate themselves with good news more than bad news. First, increased visibility could result in more extreme outcomes -more credit given for good news but also more blame for bad news (Fombrun 1996) . To combat this and shift toward more positive visibility, CEOs could have an incentive to associate themselves more with good news than bad news, with the hope that this "asymmetric self-promotion"
8 CEOs may also derive utility from the prestige of external publicity, regardless of whether there is a direct benefit to his career (Malmendier and Tate 2009) . In a more extreme version of this, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) examine the existence and implications of narcissistic CEOs, who are characterized by arrogance, a sense of entitlement, and continuous need for affirmation. Accordingly, Chatterjee and Hambrick work to capture those CEOs that want attention at any cost, making the news about themselves rather than the firm, while in our study we focus on whether the CEO is choosing to speak directly and publicly about the firm news event. We acknowledge and allow that the CEO may receive psychological benefits from prestige and visibility, but our measures work to capture the CEO's choice of association rather than the extent of dominance of the CEO over the news. 9 In a related study, Li, Minnis, Nagar, and Rajan (2014) examine the extent of communication by the CEO in conference calls relative to other call participants from the firm, and they provide evidence that this variation captures the relative magnitude of CEO knowledge. Our setting differs in that we examine CEOs' choice to be associated with a given news event rather than extent of participation in a semi-mandatory event, but CEO knowledge could influence the self-promotion decision.
will induce more favorable media coverage of the CEO. Second, CEOs may have a general preference for discussing positive versus negative firm events. A third consideration is that self-attribution bias may cause the CEO to believe that he is more responsible for good performance than for bad performance, and thus be motivated to asymmetrically associate more with good news.
However, there are potentially costs of asymmetric self-promotion. First, market participants or the media may not find the asymmetric association credible. In support of this, Kimbrough and Wang (2013) find evidence that the market discounts firms' self-serving attributions in press releases when they are more likely driven by managers' psychological biases or opportunism. A second potential cost is that by excluding himself from a bad news announcement, the CEO is less able to provide an explanation for underperformance, which could damage his future career outcomes (Hutton et al. 2003; Baginski et al 2004) . Thus, it is unclear whether CEOs self-promote in a balanced or asymmetric manner. H1b in the alternate form is as follows:
H1b: CEO self-promotion in firm-initiated press releases is asymmetrically prevalent in good versus
bad news releases.
CEO self-promotion and media coverage
It is not obvious whether CEO self-promotion affects the coverage of the professional business media. On one hand, the media aims to publish relevant stories that appeal to wide audiences, and personalizing a news event (e.g., by naming or quoting a CEO) is one way to increase its impact (Stromberg 2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) . Journalists can include personal information about the CEO at a lower cost if that information is provided by the CEO, increasing the likelihood that CEO self-promotion would increase media coverage of the CEO. Further, journalists vie for access to CEOs' time, so ingratiation by portraying the CEO in his chosen light benefits the journalist by having greater future access to breaking news.
On the other hand, a primary role of the media is to highlight relevant information for its readers, and readers value reporter-generated content over firm-provided content because of the reporter's objectivity and willingness to gather new information (Miller 2006) . Thus, the media is motivated to discuss the CEO if the CEO-related information is relevant and newsworthy and not otherwise, regardless of any CEO self-promotion in firm disclosure. In addition, studies show that media coverage is negatively biased (Green, Hand, and Penn 2014) , making it less likely that media coverage of CEOs would reflect asymmetrically positive CEO self-promotion. Whether and to what extent CEO selfpromotion impacts media coverage of the CEO is an empirical question.
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H2: CEO self-promotion in firm-initiated press releases leads to increased media visibility.
CEO self-promotion and compensation
Prior literature finds a relation between CEO media visibility and various measures of compensation and career outcomes (Milbourn 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Falato, Li, and Milbourn 2013) . However, it is not clear whether media coverage that is a result of CEO self-promotion (referred to as "promoted" coverage) has the same impact as coverage that is not a result of selfpromotion (i.e., "organic" coverage). As discussed earlier, if CEO visibility is valuable to the firm regardless of whether it is organic or promoted, we would expect promoted and organic coverage to impact compensation equally. Alternately, if stakeholders view promoted coverage as a less meaningful signal than organic coverage, and if they can distinguish between the two, then promoted coverage would impact compensation less than organic coverage. H3 in the alternate form is as follows:
H3: CEO media visibility that is a result of CEO self-promotion has a smaller impact on CEO compensation than does un-promoted (i.e., organic) media visibility.

Sample Selection and Empirical Proxies
10 An alternate potential role of the media is to influence corporate governance and monitor CEO compensation decisions by the firm, and there has been mixed evidence on the effectiveness of the media in this regard (i.e., Dyck and Zingales 2002; Core, Guay, and Larcker 2008) . In this paper, we focus on media coverage of CEOs within all firm news and its role of impacting CEO visibility rather than influencing corporate governance and policy.
Proxies for CEO self-promotion, media coverage, and the nature of news
Our first proxy for CEO self-promotion is an indicator variable for whether the CEO's name appears anywhere in the PR (variable CEONAME). We expect CEONAME to be the most basic and low cost form of self-promotion in a PR. Our second proxy expands on CEONAME by capturing whether the CEO provides a quote within the PR (variable CEOQUOTE). Specifically, we identify all strings enclosed by quotation marks within each PR, and designate them as CEO quotes if they are within 100 characters of the CEO's name, and either in the same sentence or immediately after the CEONAME sentence in a standalone sentence. Our proxies for CEO media coverage are analogous to our proxies for CEO selfpromotion. The first proxy is an indicator variable for whether the media article names the CEO (variable CEONAME_MEDIA), and the second is an indicator variable for whether the media article quotes the CEO (variable CEOQUOTE_MEDIA).
Our measures of the economic importance and sign of the news in a firm-initiated PR are based on cumulative abnormal stock returns for the two-day period surrounding the press release (days 0, 1).
Our measure of (unsigned) economic importance is absolute returns (CAR_ABS), where more important news is assumed to coincide with larger CAR_ABS. Our measure of whether the news is good or bad is based on positive versus negative signed returns (CAR). Using the short-window return around the PRs as a proxy for the news allows us to include a wide variety of qualitative and quantitative disclosures in our sample, rather than just earnings announcements or quantitative forecasts that have measurable news such as earnings surprise. In addition, returns-based measures allow us to capture the importance and implications of the news without relying on a subjective measure such as tone of disclosure.
However, the returns-based proxies assume that returns are unaffected by whether or not the CEO is individually named or quoted in a PR. Robustness tests using alternate proxies for economic importance are discussed in Section 5. presented above (below) the diagonal in Panel C of Table 1 . As expected, CEONAME and CEOQUOTE are highly correlated, and both are correlated with CEONAME_MEDIA and CEOQUOTE_MEDIA.
Sample Selection
Our CEO compensation analysis is performed at the annual level with the unit of observation as CEO-FIRM-YEAR, which requires that we aggregate our CEO-FIRM-PR data to the annual level. In aggregating to the annual level we require that the CEO is in office for a minimum of six months within the year, and that the firm issued at least one PR while the CEO was in office. The summary statistics in Panel D of Table 1 show that we are left with 10,035 CEO-FIRM-YEAR observations, with an average of 30.5 CEO-FIRM-PR observations per year (variable PR_ANN). 13 Of those, an average of 9 mention the CEO's name, and 6.6 include a CEO quote. 9,533 of the CEO-FIRM-YEAR observations have at least one associated media article. On average, the media cover 11 PRs per year, and mention the CEO's name (include a CEO quote) 1.8 (1.2) times.
Analysis
Testing H1a -CEO self-promotion in significant PRs
H1a predicts that CEOs are more likely to self-promote in PRs containing economically important news. Panel A of Figure 1 plots the average CEONAME and CEOQUOTE by decile of CAR_ABS. Both CEONAME and CEOQUOTE increase monotonically across the deciles. The data underlying Panel A of Figure 1 are presented in Panel A of Table 2 and show that CEONAME increases from 23.2% to 50.6%
from the lowest to highest CAR_ABS deciles, while CEOQUOTE increases from 15.5% to 44.4%. The differences are significant at the 1% level.
We next turn to regression analysis to control for other likely determinants of CEO selfpromotion. Our dependent variables, CEONAME and CEOQUOTE, are binary and imply the use of a logit or probit regression model, but Angrist and Pishke (2010) argue that the asymptotic properties and flexibility of linear models often produce more robust results than nonlinear models. We opt to use OLS for two main reasons: 1) OLS models can accommodate large numbers of year and CEO fixed effects;
and 2) much of our analysis below involves testing coefficient sums and differences, which are better specified in OLS models. Still, untabulated robustness tests using logit models produce qualitatively similar results. The model we implement is as follows:
There is little literature on the determinants of CEO self-promotion in firm disclosure, so our choices of Firm Controls are based on intuition and variables that are commonly important in disclosure literature.
Firms' disclosure strategies are likely determined by the strength of the information environment as well as by the extent of resources committed to investor relations, so we include firm size (i.e., log of market value of equity) and analyst following (logged) to control for these characteristics. We also include bookto-market ratio to capture expected growth. Year fixed effects control for common temporal variation.
CEO Controls are similar to prior literature and include the CEO's tenure and age in deciles, along with an indicator variable for whether the CEO was hired during the fiscal year. CEO fixed effects are included in certain specifications. Standard errors are clustered by CEO to control for autocorrelated residuals.
Regression results of (1a) are presented in Panel B of Table 2 . Column (1) shows that CEONAME increases by 1.9 percentage points for each decile of CAR_ABS, or by 17.1 percentage points between the lowest and highest deciles. Given that the unconditional average CEONAME in the lowest decile of CAR_ABS is 23.2% (as shown in Panel A), a 17.1 percentage point increase is economically significant. CEONAME is also decreasing with firm size and analyst following. Column (2) repeats (1) and adds CEO fixed effects. The coefficient on CAR_ABS is unchanged. Size and analyst following are no longer significant in the within-CEO analysis, and the coefficient on CEO tenure is now significantly negative.
The results in columns (3) and (4) for CEOQUOTE are qualitatively the same. Overall these results are consistent with the prediction in H1a: CEO self-promotion is more common in important PRs.
Finally, we examine the aggregated annual data using the following regression:
Annual Self-Promotion is either the number of PRs in which the CEO is named during the year (CEONAME_ANN) or the number of PRs with CEO quotes (CEOQUOTE_ANN). PR Count: Important is the count of the number of important PRs issued by the firm during the year, where "Important" is defined as PRs that are associated with above-median two-day CAR_ABS. PR Count: Unimportant is the count of the number of unimportant PRs, defined as PRs that are associated with below-median two-day CAR_ABS. Thus, the  1 coefficient can be interpreted as the probability that an important PR contains the CEO's name, and  2 can be interpreted as the probability that an unimportant PR contains the CEO's name. 14 Standard errors are clustered by CEO. H1a predicts that  1,1 >  1,2 .
Results of estimating (2a) are presented in Panel C of Again, these results are consistent with CEO self-promotion being more common in important PRs.
Testing H1b -Asymmetric CEO prominence in good news announcements
H1b predicts that CEOs asymmetrically self-promote in PRs containing good news versus bad news. Panel B of Figure 2 shows a pronounced U shape across deciles of signed CAR for both CEONAME and CEOQUOTE. Visual comparison of deciles 1 versus 10, 2 versus 9, and 3 versus 8 provide some evidence that both CEONAME and CEOQUOTE are higher in the positive CAR deciles. The underlying data for Figure 2 are presented in Panel A of Table 3 , and show that CEONAME and CEOQUOTE are 3.0 percentage points higher in the most extreme positive news decile versus the most extreme negative CAR decile. Regression analysis is similar to that of H1a, except an indicator for positive CAR (variable GOODNEWS) is included, along with an interaction GOODNEWS *CAR_ABS.
The  1 coefficient on CAR_ABS Decile estimates the slope for increasingly important negative news,  2 on Good News estimates the intercept shift for positive news announcements, and  3 on the interaction with Good News estimates the incremental slope for increasingly important positive news.
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H1b predicts that  2 > 0 and/or  3 > 0.
Count as the percentage of PRs that contain the CEO's name, or, similarly, the probability that each additional PR contains the CEO's name. 15 The CAR_ABS deciles are numbered 0 through 9 such that the coefficient on GOODNEWS is the difference in CEO self-promotion between the least important good and bad news deciles.
Results of estimating (1b) are tabulated in Panel B of Table 3 . Column (1) presents results for CEONAME. The significantly positive  1 coefficient indicates that CEONAME increases by 1.78
percentage points for each decile of CAR_ABS.  2 is insignificantly different from zero, indicating that there is no difference in CEO self-promotion between the least important negative and positive announcements. The positive  3 coefficient indicates that the incremental slope on good news is 0.20 percentage points greater than the slope for bad news, for a relative increase of roughly 11% (0.20 / 1.78). Column (2) includes CEO fixed effects and the results are qualitatively unchanged. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the analysis for CEOQUOTE and, again, the results are largely unchanged.
The regressions in Panel C use decile specifications to better consider the nonlinear relation between news and CEO self-promotion that is observed in Panel B of Figure 1 . Rather than include deciles of CAR_ABS as a continuous variable interacted with GOODNEWS (as in Panel B), the models include binary variables for each decile of signed CAR such that  1 on decile 1 represents the most negative news and  10 on decile 10 includes is the most positive. Decile 5 is excluded as the reference group. Results in column (1) indicate that, as expected, CEONAME is higher in the more extreme deciles of CAR. For instance, the  1 coefficient indicates that CEONAME is 15.2 percentage points more prevalent in the most extreme negative news decile as compared to the least extreme negative news (i.e., the reference decile 5). The  10 coefficient indicates that CEONAME is 18 percentage points more prevalent in the most extreme positive news decile as compared to the reference group. The bottom of Panel C indicates that CEONAME is (18 -15.2 =) 2.8 percentage points higher in the most positive news decile 10 relative to the most negative news decile 1, which is consistent with asymmetric selfpromotion. The differences decline over the less extreme deciles, and are no longer significant in the deciles closest to zero. Column (2) in Panel C repeats the analysis of CEONAME but includes CEO fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) repeat (1) and (2) Results of (2b) in Panel D of Table 3 are consistent with CEOs asymmetrically self-promoting in good news. Specifically, for CEONAME_ANN in column (1), self-promotion is 10.1 percentage points higher in important good news PRs than in important bad news PRs. The results are qualitatively unchanged for CEOQUOTE_ANN in column (2). Overall, the results in this section are consistent with H1b: CEOs asymmetrically self-associate with good news more than bad news announcements.
Testing H2 -CEO self-promotion affects media coverage
The analysis in this section is limited to only those PRs that have at least one associated media article. 16 Summary statistics in Panel B of Table 1 show that, overall, 15.6% of media coverage mentions the CEO's name (i.e., have CEONAME_MEDIA = 1) while 10.2% of media coverage includes a CEO quote Table 4 . Figure 2 plots similar analysis but within each decile of signed CAR. 16 Our analysis is essentially media coverage of the CEO conditional on media coverage of the firm event. An alternative would be to code non-existent media coverage as CEONAME_MEDIA = 0 and CEOQUOTE_MEDIA = 0. We drop observations without media coverage because doing allows us to examine the impact of CEO selfpromotion controlling for whether or not the firm receives coverage. However, untabulated robustness tests that code non-existent media coverage as CEONAME_MEDIA = 0 and CEOQUOTE_MEDIA = 0 produce qualitatively similar results.
When the CEO is not named in the PR, 10% or fewer media articles name the CEO. When the CEO is named in the PR, the prevalence of media coverage increases to up to 33%. Untabulated results show that all differences are highly significant. We use the following OLS model to assess the impact of CEO self-promotion on media-association while controlling for the nature of the firm's economic event:
Media Coverage =  +  1,1 (CEO Self-Promotion: Important, Good) (3) and (4) for CEOQUOTE.
Regression analysis of aggregated annual data is similar to model (3): 
Annual Media Coverage is the annual count of media articles that mention the CEO's name (CEONAME_MEDIA_ANN) or that quote the CEO (CEOQUOTE_MEDIA_ANN). The independent variable
Annual CEO Self-Promotion is the annual count of PRs that mention the CEO's name (CEONAME_ANN) or that quote the CEO (CEOQUOTE_ANN), and is disaggregated into four separate counts based on important versus unimportant and good versus bad news PRs.
The results of estimating (4) are tabulated in Panel C of Table 4 , and are similar to the analysis of PR-level data. The  1,1 coefficient in column (1) indicates that CEO self-promotion with an important, good news PR is associated with a 6.2 percentage point increase in the probability of media-association.
The  1,4 coefficient indicates that CEO self-promotion with an important, bad news PR is associated with a 13.6 percentage point increase in the probability of media association. Similar results are found in column (2) for CEOQUOTE. Thus, the annual data are again consistent with CEO self-promotion with leading to increased CEO media coverage.
Testing H3 -CEO self-promotion, media coverage and compensation
The tests of H3 investigate whether "organic" versus "promoted" CEO media coverage have similar associations with CEO compensation. Our analysis is based on the following regression model: the beginning of year t, we assume that the compensation committee determines salary based on media coverage received in year t-1. We use quartiles of media coverage instead of deciles, as used previously, because there is insufficient variation in media coverage to populate 10 deciles (e.g., 35% of observations have zero media coverage, so decile 1 would have 35% of observations while deciles 2 through 4 would be unpopulated). Because we measure two-year aggregate media coverage, we require that the CEO be in office for the entirety of years t and t-1 to be included in this analysis.  1 in (5) estimates the effect of CEO media coverage on compensation among observations where CEO self-promotion is equal to zero (since all observations in the bottom quartile of CEO selfpromotion have no CEO self-promotion), which we refer to as "organic" media coverage.  2 estimates the association between CEO self-promotion and compensation among observations where media coverage is zero.  3 can be interpreted as the incremental effect of CEO media coverage on compensation as CEO self-promotion increases, which we refer to as "promoted" media coverage. If promoted media coverage has a smaller impact on compensation than does "organic" media coverage, then we expect  3 < 0. However, if both organic and promoted media coverage are valuable, we expect
2-Year CEO Self-Promotion
Results of estimating (5) are presented in Table 5 . The model in column (1) excludes CEO selfpromotion. The  1 coefficient indicates that total compensation increases by 6.1% for each one-quartile increase in CEONAME_MEDIA_ANN, which is consistent with CEOs with higher media coverage receiving greater compensation, controlling for firm performance. The positive  4 coefficient indicates that CEO compensation is increasing with the amount of news released by the firm, and  7 indicates that CEO compensation is decreasing when that news tends to be negative. Column (2) introduces the variables for CEO self-promotion and the interaction with media coverage. The significantly positive  1 coefficient indicates that CEO compensation is increasing with "organic" media coverage that exists when CEO selfpromotion is zero. The  2 coefficient is insignificantly different from zero, which indicates that CEO selfpromotion with no effect on CEO media coverage has no relation with compensation.  3 is also insignificantly different from zero, which indicates that "promoted" media coverage that is likely a result of self-promotion has a similar effect on compensation than does "organic" media coverage. The results in Panel B of Table 5 use CEOQUOTE as a measure of CEO promotion and media coverage, and the results are qualitatively unchanged. Thus, we interpret these results as failing to reject H3; i.e., that "organic" and "promoted" media coverage have a similar effect on compensation.
Robustness Tests -Alternate proxy for the importance and sign of news
An assumption underlying our use of event-window stock returns to measure the significance and sign of event news is that CEO self-promotion in the PR does not materially affect the stock market's reaction to the news contained in the PR. If CEO self-promotion does impact the stock market's reaction to the news, that reaction is no longer an exogenous measure of event news. 17 Thus, in additional analysis we measure the significance of the news based on alternate proxies that are not perturbed by potentially subjective market responses. First, we proxy for important news using a binary variable for whether the PR contains an earnings announcement. Second, we proxy for the sign of the news using a binary variable for whether the PR is released on a Friday, based on prior findings that PRs on Fridays tend to contain negative news but receive similar media coverage as PRs released on Mondays through Thursdays (Niesnner 2013, deHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock 2014). In both cases, we find qualitatively similar results, i.e., CEO self-promotion increases with the importance of the news and is more common for good versus bad PRs.
Conclusion
CEO media visibility has a measurable impact on CEO career outcomes, and thus CEOs have incentives to influence the extent of their media visibility. We examine firm-initiated disclosure for evidence of CEO self-promotion, and we find that CEOs are more likely to name themselves or provide a quote in press releases for important news and for good news. In addition, we find that CEOs' association with press releases significantly increases the likelihood of media coverage of the CEO, and that the benefits of media visibility for CEO compensation are similar whether the media visibility was organic or was a result of CEO self-promotion activities. Overall, these results indicate that CEOs can effectively influence their media visibility and related compensation.
A vast literature examines compensation-related incentives of CEOs, and a more recent literature has focused on the implications of visibility (or lack thereof). We join these literatures by studying whether CEOs choose to influence their media visibility and whether these actions are effective. A limitation of our study is that we rely solely on articles from Thomson Reuters news affiliates as representative of business press, due to the lack of availability of the text of other media sources for large sample academic studies. Green, Hand, and Penn (2014) find that newswires and mainstream media (national and local) have similar coverage tendencies. However, if newswire coverage of CEO selfpromotion is systematically different from that of mainstream media, our results can only speak to media promotion of CEOs on newswires. In addition, we focus on media coverage in the two-day window around firm-initiated disclosure because our focus is on CEO self-promotion through firm disclosure and this allows for cleaner identification of the impact. However, this also results in a more narrow definition of CEOs' media visibility. Finally, we acknowledge that there are numerous potential avenues for CEOs to impact their visibility. We examine the most fundamental disclosure channel and believe that it would be correlated with actions in other channels, but we encourage future research to examine these alternate avenues as well.
Appendix A: Identifying Firm-Initiated Press Releases
To create our primary sample, we begin with all press releases distributed on the four major press release wires, as provided in the Thomson Reuters News Archive. Thomson Reuters identifies and documents the companies mentioned within each press release using a proprietary "orgid" that can be mapped to cusips (and subsequently Compustat gvkey and CRSP permno). However, being mentioned in the press release does not mean the company actually initiated the press release. Thus, we perform the following procedures to identify whether a company actually initiated the press release.
We first obtain the company name from several locations -Thomson Reuters, Compustat, and CRSP -to allow for variations. We then remove common endings and punctuation (e.g., ", Inc.", "Co.", "Company", "Intl", "LLC", etc.) and allow spaces within the company name to be optional. Using this cleaned company name, we search for its existence in a "SOURCE", "CONTACT", or "About" field within the press release. Specifically, if the company name is found in the first 255 characters after the words SOURCE or CONTACT, or immediately after "About", the press release is deemed to be initiated by that firm. In addition, if the first word of the company name (e.g., "AirTran" from "AirTran Holdings") is found in the headline, or the full company name is found in the first 255 characters after the word "About" immediately followed by just the first word of the company name, the press release is deemed to be initiated by that firm. Finally, if we cannot find a SOURCE, CONTACT, or About field in the press release, but Thomson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA) has identified the firm relevance for the article to be 0.99 or 1 (the maximum amount), we also identify it as a firm-initiated press release.
Appendix B: Variable Definitions Variable Definition
Variables in PR-level data -all variables are measured in relation to the PR date. ANALYSTS Log of the number of equity analysts following the firm, obtained from the most recent IBES consensus observation. BTM Stockholders' equity / market value of equity, calculated as of the most recent fiscal quarter-end. CAR Cumulative abnormal stock returns for the two-day period surrounding the PR release (days 0, 1) CAR_ABS Absolute value of CAR CEONAME Binary variable equal to one if the PR includes the CEO's name. On days with more than one PR, CEONAME is the maximum value of all PRs on that day. CEONAME_MEDIA Binary variable equal to one if the media article associated with a given PR includes the CEO's name. In cases where there is more than one media article associated with a given PR, CEONAME_MEDIA takes the maximum value of the media articles. CEOQUOTE Binary variable equal to one if the PR includes a quote from the CEO. On days with more than one PR, CEOQUOTE is the maximum value of the PRs on that day. CEOQUOTE_MEDIA Binary variable equal to one if the media article associated with a given PR includes a quote from the CEO. In cases where there is more than one media article associated with a given PR, CEOQUOTE_MEDIA takes the maximum value of the media articles. Panel A plots the prevalence of media articles that name the CEO (i.e., have CEONAME_MEDIA = 1) by decile of signed CAR, both for PRs that do versus do not mention the CEO's name (i.e., for PRs with CEONAME = 0 and CEONAME = 1). Panel B is a similar plot for CEOQUOTE and CEOQUOTE_MEDIA. 
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